FIVE MYTHS ABOUT SPRAWL by Michael Lewyn*
REVIEW ESSAY
Sprawl: a compact history, by Robert Bruegmann (University of Chicago Press, $27.50;
2005).
I.

INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, metropolitan America has been transformed by

“sprawl”: low-density, automobile-oriented, (usually) suburban development.1 Many
central cities have lost population,2 while their suburbs have gained residents3 and jobs.4
And cities’ remaining residents are disproportionately poor: the average income of
suburban households is nearly twice that of urban households,5 and the majority of
America’s poor now live in central cities.6 Typically, new suburban development has
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1

See ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY 18 (2005) (describing sprawl as
“low-density, scattered, urban development”); OLIVER GILLHAM: THE LIMITLESS CITY 4 (2002)
(listing variety of definitions, many of which emphasize development far from traditional regional cores as
well as automobile-oriented nature of “sprawl” development). Bruegmann’s definition also describes
sprawl as “unplanned.” See BRUEGMANN, supra. at 18 (describing sprawl as development “without
systematic large-scale or regional public land-use planning”). But if development is essentially sprawling
in nature, it is sprawl regardless of whether it was “planned” by a regional government, a local government,
or a real estate developer. Thus, the “planned” or “unplanned” nature of development should be irrelevant
to its status as “sprawl”.
2
See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 7, 14-20 (3d ed. 2003) (of the cities that were
America's twelve largest in 1950, ten lost population in later decades; generally, cities have gained
population only when they have annexed suburbs). But see infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text
(discussing recovery of some cities in 1990s).
3
See Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are The Tax Benefits of Homeownership
Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 163 n. 43 (2005) (since 1970, suburban population has grown by 40
percent).
4
See Roberta F. Mann, On The Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives Transportation Choice, 24 VA. TAX
REV. 587, 607 (2005) (two-thirds of new jobs located in suburbs).
5
See Snider, supra note 3, at 163 (average suburban household income in 1999 was $76,000, while average
urban income about $40,816).
6
See GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 132 (“almost 55 percent of the nation’s citizens living in poverty dwelt in
the inner city in 1998. In 1960, that number was less than one-third.”)
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been highly automobile-dependent: the majority of suburban jobs are not accessible
through public transit.7
A wide variety of commentators8 assert that sprawl immobilizes Americans too
young, old or poor to drive,9 increases traffic congestion and pollution by increasing
driving,10 makes Americans less healthy by discouraging walking,11 reduces the supply of
farmland and open space by consuming more land than more compact development,12
and increases overall government spending, as governments spend money on roads and
utilities for new suburbs while urban infrastructure becomes underutilized.13
In Sprawl: a compact history, Robert Bruegmann, an art historian, has painted a
superficially convincing case for the status quo, asserting that sprawl is “a natural result
of affluence that occurs in all urbanized societies.”14 Bruegmann’s book has generated
glowing media publicity15 and some favorable scholarly attention.16

7

See Mann, supra note 4, at 607.
See GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 74 (critics of sprawl include environmental groups, urban mayors,
historic preservation groups, transit advocates, and some urban planners and architects).
9
See, e.g., ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE
AMERICAN DREAM 116 (2001) (inability to walk to most activities means that “a [suburban] child’s
personal mobility extends no far than the edge of [his or her] subdivision”); id. at 123 (automobile
dependency puts nondriving elderly “out of reach of their physical and social needs”); GILLHAM, supra
note 1, at 137 (describing hardships of carless urban poor in their efforts to reach suburban jobs). Cf. Jeff
Plungis & Nick Bunkley, Innovations May Keep Seniors Safer on Road, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 14, 2005,
available at http://www.detnews.com/2005/specialreport/0503/14/A01-116287.htm (“21 percent of
Americans over 65 no longer drive. Within the non-driving population, 54 percent stay home on any given
day because they don't have a viable transportation option.”).
10
See GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 93 (as a result of sprawl, roads are “overwhelmed” and “the hours spent
driving and stuck in traffic arguably use increasing amounts of energy and generate more air pollution.”)
11
See GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 76 (suggesting that “increase in driving and the decrease in walking are
also contributing to obesity and ill health.”)
12
See GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 75, 77.
13
Id. at 124-46, 142 (raising argument, but noting that evidence unclear).
14
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save The Cities, Stop The Suburbs? 5, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=908248 (visited June 26, 2006) (describing
Bruegmann’s book). See also BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 10 (sprawl a result of “the democratization
of society [as] citizens have obtained the ability to exercise the choices that once were the sole prerogative
of the wealthy and powerful.”)
15
See Vincent J. Cannato, The Way We Live Now, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, March 20, 2006, at 33,
2006 WNLR 4965810 (book “eminently readable and rational”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Learning to Love
Sprawl, SATURDAY EVENING POST, March 1, 2006, at 90, 2006 WNLR 4261933 (book “makes a
8
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The purpose of this Review is to use Bruegemann’s defense of the status quo as a
launching point for a broader discussion of the sprawl issue. In particular, this Review
suggests that Bruegmann overestimates the universality of sprawl, by overlooking the
differences between pedestrian-friendly cities with some sprawling development and
cities in which automobile-dependent sprawl is the only choice available to most
consumers. In addition, Bruegmann understates the harmful social effects of sprawl,
especially the effect of automobile-dependent development upon nondrivers. Bruegmann
also consistently underestimates the role of government spending and regulations in
creating sprawl, and as a result fails to adequately discuss the possibility that sprawl can
be reduced by limiting, rather than increasing, the size and intrusiveness of government.
II.

Five Pro-Sprawl Myths
Bruegmann’s book claims that:
1. Sprawl has been going on for centuries, and is thus what most people naturally
desire in the absence of government coercion;17
2. Sprawl is thus the result of the free market at work, and any seemingly prosprawl government policies were virtually irrelevant to the growth of automobiledependent suburbia;18

strong case that a lot of the things we think we know about sprawl just ain’t so . . . I hope that it gets the
attention it deserves”); Kevin Nance, Learning to Sprawl: Think the suburbs are getting too crowded?,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, December 27, 2005, 2005 WLNR 20976009 at 39 (“the early critical response to
Bruegmann’s book has been mostly positive”).
16
See Garnett, supra note 14, at 15 (criticizing some of Bruegmann’s arguments, but describing book as “a
valuable addition to the voluminous land use literature – well-researched and well-written, thought
provoking, and full of captivating history”).
17
See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 10 (sprawl a “predictable result of increasing wealth”), 23-32
(describing premodern and 19th-century “sprawl”), 73-80 (describing trend towards sprawl in affluent
countries).
18
Id. at 101-06.
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3. Regardless of the origins of sprawl, the harmful side effects of sprawl are
overrated by critics of the status quo;19
4. Sprawl cannot be limited without government regulations that artificially
constrict the housing supply and thus raise housing prices;20 and
5. The anti-sprawl movement is elitist.21
As will be shown below, each of these assertions is flawed. In fact, the status quo
is in part a result of government intervention in the economy, has negative side effects
ignored by Bruegmann, can be changed without making government more intrusive, and
is opposed by Americans from a wide variety of backgrounds.
A. Myth One: The Status Quo is Eternal
One of the most widely praised elements of Bruegmann’s book is his use of
ancient history and comparative data to justify the status quo.22 Brugemann tells a story
of eternal sprawl, pointing out that aristocrats have purchased country estates in
civilizations as diverse as ancient Rome and 18th-century London.23 He goes on to show
that in both Europe and in the United States, some central cities have declined, and auto
use has risen in recent decades.24 Based on these facts, Brugemann concludes that sprawl
is a “predictable result of increasing wealth”25 that has given the middle class “the ability

19

Id. at 138-50.
Id. at 169-219.
21
See infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text (describing quotes scattered throughout book).
22
See Garnett, supra note 14 (at 2 (“Bruegmann’s most important contribution is to place the current debate
. . . . in historical perspective”); Cannato, supra note 15 (“Bruegmann also places the issue within the larger
historical context . . . He attempts to show that dispersal from high-density core areas to low-density outer
areas is a phenomenon common not just to modern America, but also ancient Rome and 19th-century
England”); Reynolds, supra note 15 (“Rich people have always wanted to sprawl”); Nance, supra note 15
(“Overall, Bruegmann contends, sprawl is a natural, historic, worldwide process of decentralization that’s
been going on at least since ancient Rome and China, when the wealthy got away from the bustle and noise
of city centers by building homes in outlying areas.”)
23
See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 23-24.
24
Id. at 73-80.
25
Id. at 10.
20

4

to exercise the choices that once were the sole prerogative of the wealthy and
powerful.”26 And if sprawl is what the middle class wants, any attempt to limit sprawl or
its effects is doomed.27
There is a grain of truth underlying Brugemann’s version of history: given the
wide variety of consumer tastes, some people will always prefer relatively scattered, lowdensity housing. But Bruegmann’s story overlooks important differences of degree: every
city may have some sprawling development, but not every city is equally dominated by
sprawl. In the most sprawl-bound cities and metropolitan areas, most residents are
unable to get to jobs or shops without driving, and carless residents are thus virtually
helpless.28 For example, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, a city with over 500,000
people,29 buses do not run at night or on Sundays,30 and thus the 8.2% of households
without cars31 are essentially frozen out of jobs that require evening work and are not
within walking or bicycling distance. In cities planned around the automobile, streets are
often so wide, and traffic moves so fast, that the basic human act of walking outdoors
becomes dangerous.32 Many streets lack sidewalks, and as a result pedestrians must share

26

Id.
Id. at 11 (remedies to sprawl have consistently been “ineffective and in some cases have led to
unintended consequences arguably worse than the initial problem.”)
28
See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text (statistics on number of nondriving Americans; about onethird of all Americans, including 11.5% of adults, have no drivers’ license, while 21% of senior citizens,
about half of disabled, and majority of welfare recipients do not drive).
29
Vincent G. Spadafora, ed., THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2006 at 480 (Oklahoma
City had 528,042 residents in 2004).
30
See, e.g., GENERAL INFORMATION, METRO TRANSIT, available at www.gometro.org (visited
Feb. 2, 2006) (in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, buses do not run on Sundays or after 7:30 at night); Michael
E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just An Environmental Issue, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 301, 348-50 (2001)
(citing other examples of inadequate transit service throughout the United States).
31
See BIKES AT WORK, THE CARFREE CENSUS DATABASE, available at
http://www.bikesatwork.com/carfree/carfree-census-database.html (visited May 29, 2006). This site has a
search engine that allows one to rank cities by transit ridership and other commuting-related variables.
32
See SURFACE TRANSPORTATION POLICY PROJECT, MEAN STREETS 2004, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, available at http://www.transact.org/library/reports_html/ms2004/exec_sum.asp (visited
Feb. 2, 2005) (over 4000 American pedestrians per year killed by automobile traffic, and “the most
27
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streets with cars.33 In such cities, automobile ownership is an “absolute necessity”34 for
most. Bruegmann treats sprawl as the democratization of the country squire lifestyle-35
but there is nothing democratic or egalitarian about a system that limits transportation to
those who can participate in the suburban car culture.
By contrast, residents of less sprawling regions have a variety of transportation
options. For example, the majority of New York City residents get to work via public
transit (as opposed to 1% of Oklahoma City residents),36 and the city has prosperous
neighborhoods where most households do not even own cars.37 In metropolitan New
York, transportation choice is not limited to city residents: New York City has some
highly automobile-dependent suburbs,38 but also has two suburbs where a majority of
commuters use public transit regularly.39 In other words, New York accommodates a

dangerous places to walk are metropolitan areas marked by newer, low-density developments, where wide,
high-speed arterial streets offer few sidewalks or crosswalks.”).
33
See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (And Order In) The City, 57 STANFORD L. REV. 1, 35 (2004)
(“wide residential streets without sidewalks” now common); Ann DeFrange, Reader stands ready to battle
city’s lack of sidewalks, OKLAHOMAN, June 9, 2004, at 19A, 2004 WLNR 21091635 (Many Oklahoma
City streets lack sidewalks). For some examples of streets without sidewalks, see, e.g., MICHAEL
LEWYN, BUCKHEAD- DON’T EVEN THINK OF WALKING HERE!, available at
http://atlantaphotos.fotopic.net/p14010314.html (residential street without sidewalks) (visited July 4, 2006);
MICHAEL LEWYN, BUFORD HIGHWAY- ANOTHER BAD BLOCK FOR PEDESTRIANS, available
at http://atlantaphotos.fotopic.net/p14010301.html (visited July 4, 2006) (commercial street without
sidewalks).
34
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Eye That Never Sleeps: Privacy and Law In The Internet Era, 40 TULSA L.
REV. 561, 563 (2005).
35
See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 10 (tying sprawl to “the democratization of society” as middle class
now able “to exercise the choices that once were the sole prerogative of the wealthy and powerful.”)
36
See CARFREE CENSUS DATABASE, supra note 31.
37
See CITY DATA, 10162 ZIP CODE DETAILED PROFILE, available at http://www.citydata.com/zips/10162.html (visited Feb. 2, 2006) (in one New York City zip code with average household
income of over $100,000, 550 of area’s 943 households had no car).
38
See People v. Coutard, 454 N.Y.S. 2d 639, 642 (Dist. Ct. 1982) (“in a suburban county such as [Nassau
County], the use of an automobile by most of its citizens is often as necessary as placing bread upon their
tables."); David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1751 (2005)
(describing Nassau County as New York City suburb).
39
See CARFEE CENSUS DATABASE, supra note 31 (in Hoboken, New Jersey and Bronxville, New
York, majority of residents get to work by using public transit); Doug Halonen, Station Affiliates on Verge
of Victory, TELEVISION WEEK, Oct. 10, 2005, at 1, 2005 WLNR 16892609 (Bronxville a “swank New
York suburb”); John Kelly, Trade Center victims were mostly men with families, HOUSTON
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wide variety of consumer preferences: preferences for city living, preferences for sprawl,
and preferences for transit-oriented suburbia.
Cities in some other affluent countries are similar to New York City. Over 70%
of Tokyo residents walk, bicycle or ride transit to work, as do 69% of Stockholm
residents and 62% of Munich residents.40 If some affluent places are less “sprawling”
than others, it logically follows that public policy can affect the degree of sprawl in
affluent, democratic societies. In other words, some low-density development might be
normal in an affluent, democratic society- but not the degree of sprawl that makes
constant driving a necessity for most people.
Bruegmann implies that the differences between the United States and Europe are
meaningless, because even compact European cities have become more suburbanized and
more automobile-dependent.41 But in Europe, transit ridership has actually increased in
recent years: in European Union countries, streetcar and subway ridership rose by 12.5%
between 1995 and 2003,42 and despite massive highway construction by European
governments,43 the automobile’s share of European passenger transportation increased

CHRONICLE, Oct. 27, 2001, at A13, 2001 WLNR 11719685 (mentioning Hoboken on list of New York
City suburbs).
40
See PETER NEWMAN AND JEFFREY KENWORTHY, SUSTAINABILITY AND CITIES:
OVERCOMING AUTOMOBILE DEPENDENCE 83 (1999).
41
See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 52 (citing numerous examples, including Paris’s loss of jobs to its
suburbs); id. at 203 (“Just as in America, European urban dwellers are using their cars more and public
transportation less.”)
42
See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ENERGY AND TRANSPORT IN FIGURES 2005, TABLE 3.3.2,
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/figures/pocketbook/doc/2005/etif_2005_whole_en.pdf
(“EUROPEAN TRANSPORT”)(visited June 9, 2006) (“ (listing growth rate for “Tram and Metro”, and
adding that bus ridership grew by 3.7%). A “tram” is essentially what Americans would term a
“streetcar”, and a “Metro” what Americans would describe as a subway. See European Union,
Commission Regulation No. 1192/2003, July 3, 2003 (defining terms), available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_167/l_16720030704en00130016.pdf (visited June 9, 2006).
43
EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 42, Table 3.5.1 (length of motorways more than tripled in
European Union countries between 1970 and 2001).
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only slightly between 1995 and 2003 (from 74.1% of all passenger miles to 74.4%).44
And after losing population for decades, some European core cities have begun to regain
population.45
Even in the United States, there is some reason to believe that sprawl is not an
unstoppable trend. American public transit ridership has risen by over 20% in the past
decade,46 and (as Bruegmann admits) some American cities are beginning to grow and
retain middle-class residents,47 while some American suburbs have become more densely
populated.48 While some cities have continued to lose population,49 eight of America’s
ten largest cities gained population between 1990 and 2000,50 including two (New York
and Chicago) that had lost population in earlier decades.51 Similarly, several smaller
cities gained population in the 1990s after having lost people in earlier decades.52 Thus,

44

EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 42, Table 3.3.2.
See ISRA, ON A THEORY OF URBAN SPRAWL AND SPRAWLING 18 available at
http://www.pik-potsdam.de/urbs/projekt/vienna_theory.pdf (visited May 22, 2006)
(about half of European core cities gained population in 1990s, after losing people in earlier decades);
DEPARTMENT FOR COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, WHERE DO WE STAND?,
available at http://www.odpm.gov.uk/pub/106/p1130106.jpg (same) (visited May 22, 2006). Moreover,
central cities’ population losses in prior decades may have been caused not by consumer demand for sprawl
but by government-funded highway construction (which encouraged suburban growth) and by regionwide
population losses that held depopulated city and suburb alike. See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 42
(Europe did not experience baby boom after World War II, and as a result many regions suffered
population decline); supra note 43 (noting growth of highway system in Europe), infra notes 62-63 and
accompanying text (explaining how highways promote suburban growth).
46
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2006 722 (125th ed. 2006) (after decreasing in early 1990s, transit ridership rose from
7.7 billion passengers in 1995 to over 9.4 billion in 2003) (“2006 ABSTRACT”); BRUEGMANN, supra
note 1, at 269 n. 49 (admitting that “[t]ransit ridership, in the last few years, has risen faster than
automobile travel” but claiming that this fact “has not been very meaningful” because transit ridership so
low).
47
Id. at 51-56.
48
Id. at 67-69.
49
See SPADAFORA, supra note 29, at 480 (listing gains and losses of various cities).
50
Id.
51
Id. New York lost population between 1950 and 1980, and Chicago lost population between 1950 and
1990. Id.
52
Id. Indianapolis, San Francisco, Fort Worth, Seattle, Boston, Denver, Portland, Kansas City, Atlanta,
Omaha, Oakland, Minneapolis, Tampa, Madison, and Fort Wayne all lost population in the 1970s but
regained residents in at least one of the following two decades. Id. Ten of these fifteen cities apparently
continued to gain population between 2000 and 2004. See 2006 ABSTRACT, supra note 46, at 32-35
45
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Bruegmann’s vision of sprawl as inevitable and natural is belied by the countertrends
towards higher transit ridership and urban recovery.
In sum, some sprawling development may be universal- but the amount of
automobile-dependent development in a city or region has varied tremendously between
cities, and the trend towards sprawl is no longer one-sided. Thus, sprawl in its most
extreme forms is by no means inevitable in free, affluent societies.
B. Myth Two: The Market, Not Government, Created Sprawl
Bruegmann’s theory that sprawl is “natural”53 implicitly rests upon the
assumption that sprawl is almost entirely a result of consumer preferences as expressed in
the free market. If sprawl has been caused by government regulations and programs,
sprawl is hardly inevitable or natural, because there would be less sprawl in a more
libertarian society. To his credit, Bruegmann (unlike some other pro-sprawl
commentators)54 is at least willing to respond to arguments that sprawl has been partially
caused by government policies rather than by the free market.55 In particular, he admits
that numerous commentators attribute sprawl to government highway spending,56 federal
mortgage subsidies targeted towards suburban homeowners,57 and pro-sprawl zoning
regulations.58 Bruegmann’s responses to these arguments, however, are based on

(Census Department estimates that Fort Worth, Indianapolis, Denver, Omaha, Seattle, Portland, Atlanta,
Tampa, Kansas City, and Madison gained population, while Boston, San Francisco, Oakland, Minneapolis
and Fort Wayne did not).
53
Id.
54
See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, “URBAN SPRAWL” AND LIBERAL GALL, available at
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell062999.asp (visited June 9, 2006) (attacking “a
government-sponsored crusade against urban sprawl” without acknowledging the possibility of pro-sprawl
government policies, and asserting that “The real objection [to sprawl] may be that all this is going on
without the guiding hand of Big Brother.”)
55
For discussions of how government policies have accelerated sprawl, see, e.g., Lewyn, supra note 30, at
304-35; GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 15-16, 32-38, 42-45, 134-36.
56
BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 101-02.
57
Id. at 102-04.
58
Id. at 105-06.
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questionable logic.
1.

Do Highways Matter?

Throughout the 20th century, government at all levels favored highways over
public transit.59 Government highway spending began early in the 20th century,60 but
accelerated after 1956 when the federal government enacted the Interstate Highway Act,
which committed the federal government to paying 90 percent of the cost of America’s
interstate highway network.61 In the decades immediately after the passage of the
Highway Act, central cities lost population faster than ever before or afterwards.62
Highway spending almost certainly accelerated suburbanization: when government builds
a superhighway from downtown X to suburb Y, people who work downtown can
commute more quickly from suburb Y to downtown, and thus are more likely to move to
suburb Y. By contrast, when suburb Y was served by dirt roads, it was far less appealing
to commuters.63
In addition to making suburbs more attractive to commuters, highways made
cities less attractive by destroying urban neighborhoods. Millions of houses in cities

59

See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 312-15 (giving brief history of government support for highways).
Id. at 312-13. See also BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 101 (“Most cities and urban areas had extensive
plans for superhighways already in the 1930s; many of them had allocated large sums of county and state
money to begin construction of these roads long before the federal interstate highway program of the
1950s.”)
61
See GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 35 (describing Interstate Highway Act in more detail).
62
See Patrick A. Simmons and Robert A. Lang, The Urban Turnaround, in REDEFINING URBAN &
SUBURBAN AMERICA 51, 54 (Bruce Katz & Robert E. Lang, eds.) (2003) (older cities lost more
population in 1960s and 1970s than in earlier or later decades); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1952 18-21 (73rd ed. 1952) (of
eighteen cities with population over 500,000, all but four gained population during 1930s, and all but one
actually gained population during 1940s).
63
See GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 36 (highways “improved access between city and suburb, making it
easier to commute to ever more distant outlying areas.”); Lewyn, supra note 30, at 321(citation omitted)
(when National Association of Home Builders asked what amenity would encourage them to move to a
new area, 55% of respondents picked highway access, more than any alternative).
60
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were bulldozed in order to create space for highways and other redevelopment schemes.64
For example, nearly 20% of Baltimore’s African-Americans were displaced by I-95 and
I-83,65 20,000 families in Miami were displaced by highway construction,66 and 19,000
Clevelanders were displaced by one downtown freeway.67 Even neighborhoods not
destroyed by highways were damaged by expressway construction. For example, before
the enactment of the Highway Act, Claiborne Avenue was the main street of the Treme
section of New Orleans, with 200 businesses and a 6100-foot median.68 Highway
bureaucrats built I-10 on Claiborne Avenue, thus cutting the neighborhood in half and
turning the median into a strip of dirt.69 After the destruction of Claiborne Avenue,
Treme deteriorated: a more recent survey of area businesses showed that 63% of business
owners would not invest in another business in the neighborhood due to the
neighborhood’s physical unattractiveness and high crime.70
Because government did not always replace housing units that were destroyed in
order to make room for highways, highway construction reduced the urban housing
supply and thus reduced city population. For example, in Cincinnati the construction of
I-75 displaced residents of the city’s African-American West End, and the displaced
West Enders flooded nearby neighborhoods (causing massive racial transition and “white

64

See Tullock v. State Highway Commission of Mo., 507 F.2d 712, 714 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1974) (between 1950
and 1968, over two million dwellings destroyed due to highway construction and urban renewal, and
62,000 individuals and families were displaced by federal highway programs in 1968 alone). Cf.
GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 42-43 (describing “urban renewal” program mentioned in Tullock).
65
See Lee R. Epstein, Where Yards Are Wide: Have Land Use Planning and Law Gone Astray?, 21 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REVIEW 345, 370 (1997)
66
See Andrea Eaton, Impact of Urban Renewal or Land Development Initiatives on African-American
Neighborhoods in Dade County, Florida, 3 HOW. SCROLL 49, 55 (1995).
67
See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 316 (citation omitted).
68
Beverly H. Wright, New Orleans Neighborhoods Under Siege, in JUST TRANSPORTATION 121, 13233 (Robert D. Bullard & Glenn S. Johnston eds., 1997).
69
Id. at 133-34.
70
Id. at 135.
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flight” from those neighborhoods).71 One such neighborhood, Mount Auburn, changed
from 84% white in 1960 to 74% black in 1970;72 presumably, at least some of the whites
who left Mount Auburn moved to Cincinnati’s suburbs.
And when a city loses population to its suburbs, it may become less attractive in a
variety of other ways. For example, the city’s tax base might decline, thus forcing the
city to raise taxes to pay for city services.73 And if the people who leave the city are
disproportionately middle-and upper-class, the remaining, relatively low-income city
residents might support redistributionist policies that increase taxes and thus drive away
even more middle-class voters.74
Nevertheless, Bruegmann speculates that highways may have actually helped
cities, noting that roads “were heavily supported by central-city interests because these
individuals believed that these roads, like the railroads before them, would reinforce the
centrality of the downtown and make it easier for people from throughout the region to
get to it.”75 However, Bruegmann does not explain why he thinks this view was

71

See Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 1993 WL 761489, at *7 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 1993) (noting that in
Cincinnati, “African American citizens were being forced to move into previously white neighborhoods as
a result of being displaced by the construction of the Interstate Highway through their neighborhood”, thus
implying that government did not provide replacement housing to people whose homes were destroyed due
to highway construction); Dan Hurley, New Y, old vision for the West End, CINCINNATI POST, May 26,
2006, available at http://news.cincypost.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060526/LIFE/605260340/1/BACK01 (West End was an African-African neighborhood in which many homes destroyed by I-75);
Lewyn, supra note 30, at 316 (displaced West End residents flooded nearby neighborhoods).
72
Id. at 316 n. 128 (citation omitted).
73
See Katharine J. Jackson, The Need For Regional Management of Growth: Boulder, Colorado As A Case
Study, 37 URB. LAW. 299, 303 (2005) (as a city's population shrinks, property values and property tax
bases decrease, "forcing [the city] to raise taxes to pay for basic city services."); Ybarra v. Town of Los
Altos Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742, 750 n. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (cities “are trying to reverse the population
movements that have left them with concentrations of the poor, high service demands, and a stagnant tax
base”).
74
See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 336-38 (discussing Washington, DC under Marion Barry as case study of
high-tax government caused by flight of middle-class voters from city electorate).
75
BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 108.
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correct.76 Similarly, he asserts that “Given the strong rebound of many of these cities in
recent years, it is altogether possible that, at some point in the near future, most people
will conclude that [expressways] were actually largely beneficial for central cities.”77
Again, Bruegmann does not explain why “most people” would so conclude. And his
conclusion seems highly implausible, given the rapid decline of cities during the years
immediately after the passage of the Highway Act.78 If cities rebound, their success is
likely to be despite, not because of, the highways that fed suburban growth.
Bruegmann’s weakest argument is that suburb-oriented government spending
merely compensates for urban-oriented government spending. For example, he argues
that “federal spending today goes more heavily per capita to central cities than to
suburbs, primarily because of the enormous price tag of social security payments, which
go primarily to an older population that remains disproportionately in the central cities.”79
Even if it was true that senior citizens mostly lived in central cities,80 Social Security
payments do not compensate for highway spending, because Social Security spending
goes to a retiree whether she lives in a city or a suburb. By contrast, highways going
from a city to a suburb benefit suburbanites by shortening their commutes, but arguably
harm city residents both by destroying city neighborhoods and by encouraging
76
If he in fact thinks so: he also writes that highways “made leaving town easier”, id., and then writes that
“both [highways and railroads] caused some dispersal and both caused some centralization”. Id. The first
remark suggests that highways did cause sprawl after all, while the second statement is more equivocal.
77
BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 101-02.
78
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
79
BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 105.
80
In fact, this is not always the case. For example, in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, the percentage
of central city population over 65 is actually lower than the percentage of metropolitan area population over
65. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CITIES WITH 100,000 OR MORE POPULATION IN 2000 RANKED
BY PERCENT POPULATION 65 YEARS AND OVER, 2000 IN ALPHABETIC ORDER
http://www.census.gov/statab/ccdb/cit2061a.txt (In New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago, percentages
of urban population over 65 were 11.7%, 9.7% and 10.3% respectively); U.S. Census BUREAU,
METROPOLITAN AREA RANKINGS OF PERSONS 65 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/metro09.prn (visited June 9, 2006) (comparable percentages for New
York, Los Angeles and Chicago metropolitan areas were 13.4%, 10.2% and 11.3% respectively).
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outmigration from cities (thus reducing urban tax bases, thus leading to higher taxes).81
In other words, Social Security spending is place-neutral – but highway spending is not.
2.

Housing Subsidies

Since the 1930s, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has insured home
construction loans in order to stimulate the housing industry.82 Specifically, the
FHA guaranteed over 90% of the value of collateral for home loans, so that down
payments of only 10% of home value became the norm (as opposed to the 33% down
payments common before FHA’s creation).83 For the first few decades of its existence,
the FHA refused to guarantee home loans in racially integrated areas.84 Because suburban
areas were usually whiter than cities,85 this policy encouraged Americans to purchase
FHA-insured homes in suburbs.86
Bruegmann apparently defends the FHA’s racist policies, asserting that “there
was, in fact, a great deal of evidence over many years indicating that property values did
81

See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text (describing impact of highways upon cities). Bruegmann
also asserts that in any city/suburb accounting, “the spending by the federal government since the
eighteenth century for ports and railroads, bridges and highways, universities and hospitals located
primarily in the central cities would have to be factored in.” Id. This argument lacks merit for two reasons.
First, because government was far smaller prior to the 1950s than it is today, such expenses were not
always government-financed. See Eric A. Cesnik, The American Street, 33 URB. LAW. 147, 167 (2001)
(streets often privately financed until 20th century); U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: HISTORICAL TABLES, FISCAL YEAR 2007
23 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/hist.pdf (visited June 9, 2006) (federal
spending was only 3.4% of GNP in 1930, grew to 11.6% of GNP in 1948, and is now about 20% of GNP),
312-13 (state and local government spending grew from 5.6% of GNP in 1948 to over 11% of GNP today).
Second, highway spending, as noted above, was often not beneficial for cities. See supra notes 62-74 and
accompanying text.
82
See GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 37; Lewyn, supra note 30, at 305.
83
See Victor A. Bolden, Where Does New York City Go From Here: Chaos or Community, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1031, 1052 n. 26 (1996).
84
See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 207-08 (1985); GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 135.
85
And the racial difference between cities and suburbs may itself have been due to suburban governments’
zoning policies that excluded inexpensive housing, thus keeping African-Americans out of those suburbs.
See John Powell, Segregation and Educational Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public Schools, 17 HAMLINE J.
L & PUB. POL’Y 337, 352 (1996) (because blacks poorer than whites, suburban exclusion of inexpensive
housing excludes African-Americans from suburbs).
86
GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 134-35.
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tend to drop as neighborhoods got older and experienced ethnic or racial turnover.”87
Even if Bruegmann’s claim is factually correct, 88 he overlooks the possibility that
subsidies such as FHA loan insurance might make moving to suburbia cheaper at the
margin: that is, some people might be willing to leave a low-value urban neighborhood if
they could make a 10% down payment on a suburban home, but would not be willing to
move if they had to make a 33% down payment on a suburban home. To the extent that
would-be homeowners fell into this category, FHA mortgage insurance encouraged
suburban growth.
Moreover, the FHA’s tilt towards suburbia included a variety of policies unrelated
to racial turnover. The FHA defined “low-risk” areas appropriate for FHA loans not just
as lily-white neighborhoods, but also as neighborhoods that were newer and less compact
– policies which favored suburbia because suburbs tended to be newer and less densely
populated.89 FHA also set minimum standards for new housing construction that
mandated low-density, automobile-dependent design.90 Thus, FHA policies both

87

BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 102. He also states that “No amount of regulatory control would have
altered this fact of life.” Id. But the FHA was not trying to “control” private racism, but to subsidize such
racism- a very different issue.
88
Bruegmann provides no evidence for this assertion. Although he does footnote this statement, his
footnote relates to an entirely different issue: the anti-urban bias of an entirely different government
agency, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC). HOLC “redlined” urban neighborhoods by issuing
maps that graded neighborhoods and colored the riskiest areas red. AMY HILLIER, REDLINING IN
PHILADELPHIA, available at http://cml.upenn.edu/redlining/intro.html (visited July 1, 2006)
Bruegmann writes that HOLC’s influence was limited because it did not make its maps available to private
lenders. Id. at 248 n. 12. However, Amy Hillier, the researcher cited by Bruegmann, has pointed out that
HOLC was far less influential than FHA. See HILLIER, supra. (FHA manuals “established highly
racialized neighborhood standards that lenders were encouraged to consider if they wanted to receive FHA
insurance. FHA's neighborhood appraisal standards ultimately had a much greater impact on lending
patterns in urban communities than HOLC's maps.”) Thus, Bruegmann’s footnote does not support either
his broad claim that FHA’s anti-urban bias was unimportant or his narrower claim that racial integration
lowers property values.
89
See JACKSON, supra note 84, at 207-08 (describing FHA policies and quoting FHA manuals asserting
that “crowded neighborhoods lessen desirability” as do “older properties in a neighborhood”).
90
See MICHAEL SOUTHWORTH & ERAN BEN-JOSEPH, REGULATED STREETS: THE EVOLUTION OF
STANDARDS FOR SUBURBAN RESIDENTIAL STREETS 34-36 (1993) (FHA favored cul-de-sacs over grid
streets, houses sitting on at least 6000 square feet of land, and blocks at least 600 feet long). Compare
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subsidized migration to suburbs and mandated that those suburbs be designed in a
“sprawling” manner.
As a result of these policies, the overwhelming majority of FHA-insured homes
were in suburbs, even where nearby central cities were predominantly white. For
example, in metropolitan St. Louis, 91 percent of new homes insured by the FHA during
the 1930s were in suburban locations,91 even though the city of St. Louis was less than 12
percent black in 1930.92
More plausibly, Bruegmann points out that the federal income tax deduction for
interest on mortgages does not favor suburbs, because this deduction can be used for “any
kind of single-family unit, whether a house in the suburbs or a condominium in a highrise downtown.”93 But even here, Bruegmann oversimplifies. Condominiums were not
common (or even authorized by most states’ statutes) until the 1960s.94 Before that time,
Americans could not easily purchase apartments,95 and thus had to buy a house in order
to qualify for the home mortgage deduction. Because houses tend to be

REID EWING, PEDESTRIAN- AND TRANSIT-FRIENDLY DESIGN: A PRIMER FOR SMART GROWTH 2-4, available
at http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/ptfd_primer.pdf (visited June 1, 2006) (arguing pedestrianfriendly, transit-friendly development requires higher densities than are common in many suburbs and
blocks no longer than 300 feet; higher density means more people can walk to transit stops, and short
blocks mean pedestrians can cross street more frequently); DUANY ET. AL., supra note 9, at 23 (cul-desac street pattern discourages walking because residential streets not connected to each other, which means
pedestrians must go out of their way to visit nearby residential streets) .
91
See GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 135 (citing data for St. Louis, and citing similar results for other
metropolitan areas).
92
See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1935 25
(57th ed. 1935), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1935-02.pdf (visited June
11,2006) (city of St. Louis 11.6 percent black). (“1935 ABSTRACT”)
93
BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 103.
94
See GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 59 (“it wasn’t until the 1960s that the condominium was introduced
here.”); Aaron M. Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners
Association?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1109-10 (1969) (first state statute dealing with condominiums
was in 1958, and federal mortgage insurance for condominiums not available until 1961).
95
GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 59 (condominium form of ownership “made it possible for city dwellers to
own rather than rent their apartments”).
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disproportionately located in suburbs,96 the home mortgage deduction tended to favor
migration to suburbia until the 1960s.
2.

Zoning

As Bruegmann admits, municipal zoning codes often mandate segregation of
housing from other land uses and require low population density.97 These policies, by
increasing the distance between housing and other land uses, ensure that many Americans
cannot live within walking distance of shops or offices, thus effectively forcing
Americans into their cars.98 Nevertheless, Bruegmann asserts that “zoning itself cannot
be blamed for most of the sprawl that has occurred because sprawl was well underway
long before zoning became common in American cities, which only started to happen in
the 1920s.”99 Bruegmann’s suggestion that “most of the sprawl that has occurred”
preceded zoning is misleading. As of 2003, there were 120.7 million occupied housing
units in the United States.100 Only 9.6 million of these units (or about 8 percent) were
built before 1920.101 Thus, most of America’s housing was created after zoning became
common.
Bruegmann also suggests that because some suburbs have become more densely
populated in recent years, “zoning has changed as necessary to accommodate market

96

See Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing The Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private
Collective Rights to Individual Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L REV. 827, 839 (1999) (suburbs often
exclude or restrict construction of apartments through zoning).
97
See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 105.
98
Cf. Andres Duany & Emily Talen, Making the Good Easy: The Smart Code Alternative, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1445, 1448 (2002) (explaining that in neighborhoods organized around “the mobility pattern of
the pedestrian,” most residents should live no more than a quarter of a mile from stores and schools).
99
See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 105.
100
U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey for the United States, 2003, available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs03/tab1a1.htm (visited June 11, 2006).
101
Id. About 11.8 million units were built between 1920 and 1940, 21.5 million between 1940 and 1960,
40 million between 1960 and 1980, and 38.7 million after 1980. Id.
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realities”102 – in other words, that zoning merely mimics the market, mandating sprawl
when the market wants sprawl and changing when the market wants change.
But a few lines later, Bruegmann concedes that zoning occasionally frustrates the
market, asserting that low-density zoning designed to prevent rural areas from turning
into suburbs “almost certainly forced many landowners to buy more land than they
otherwise would have wanted, leading to lower densities than would have been the case
without the regulations.”103 Bruegmann’s treatment of zoning seems to be governed by a
double standard: conventional pro-sprawl zoning merely tracks the market- but zoning
designed to limit sprawl successfully frustrates consumer demand.
Moreover, surveys of developers suggest that pro-sprawl land use regulation
really does impede, rather than following, market pressures for more compact housing.
In 2001, the Urban Land Institute (ULI) (a developers’ trade association)104 conducted a
survey asking developers about the impact of zoning upon “alternatives to conventional,
low-density, automobile-oriented, suburban development”.105 85.4% of developers
surveyed agreed that the supply of such development was inadequate to meet market
demand,106 and 78.2% of developers identified government regulation as a significant
barrier to such development.107 The ULI survey also revealed that over 60 percent of

102

Id.
Id.
104
JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN TRANSPORTATION AND
METROPOLITAN LAND-USE 125 (2006 (describing ULI as “national organization of land developers”).
105
Id. at 126.
106
Id. at 128. This group was divided between 66.8% who believed that there was generally not enough
compact development to meet consumer demand, and an additional 18.6% who responded that the supply
of such development was high enough to meet consumer demand- but not in the “right locations”
(presumably meaning the neighborhoods where consumer demand for compact development was highest).
Id.
107
Id. at 129. By contrast, only 35.3% invoked financing as an obstacle to more compact development, and
only 26.3% listed inadequate consumer demand. Id. Thus, it cannot plausibly be argued that pedestrianfriendly development is rare solely because of lack of market demand.
103
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developers in both cities and inner suburbs stated that they wished to build more compact
development than was generally allowed by government regulation.108
For example, in California’s Silicon Valley, exploding housing prices might, in
the absence of government regulation, cause landowners to build smaller houses and
more multifamily developments in order to meet consumer demand for affordable
housing.109 But in Silicon Valley communities such as Santa Clara and Cupertino, almost
every property zoned as single-family in the 1960s remains single-family today.110
Similarly, in Massachusetts only 3/10 of 1% of single-family parcels were rezoned
between 1970 and 1999,111 despite the fact that housing prices near Boston have
exploded.112 Thus, zoning does not always respond to consumer demand for more
compact development.113
C. Myth Three: Sprawl Is Harmless
Even if government spending and government zoning policies have depopulated
cities and made suburbia automobile-dependent, sprawl is hardly a serious social problem
if its overall effects are harmless or beneficial. And so Bruegmann attacks a wide variety

108

Id. at 131. In particular, about 80 percent of developers indicated that they would develop more
compactly in inner suburbs if zoning was less burdensome, and over 60 percent similarly indicated that
relaxed regulations would lead them to develop more densely in central cities. Id. By contrast, developers
in outer suburbs and rural areas were less interested in more compact development. Id.
109
Id. at 77.
110
Id. at 204 n. 1.
111
Id. at 78.
112
See EDWARD L. GLAESER, JENNY SCHUETZ AND BRYCE WARD, REGULATION AND THE
RISE OF HOUSING PRICES IN GREATER BOSTON 1, 7 available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/rappaport/downloads/housing_regulations/regulation_housingprices.pdf
(visited June 11,2006) (housing prices grew by 210% in metro Boston between 1980 and 2004, while
number of permits decreased)
113
Indeed, local governments have a strong political incentive to ignore consumer demand for new housing
of any type: the homeowners who often dominate local electorates may wish to preserve the status quo in
order to keep housing scarce and thus keep property values high. See Audrey G. McFarlane, Regulation
and the Four Dimensions of Class in Land Use, 22 J. L. AND POLITICS 33, 39-40 (2006) (explaining
local government incentives behind rigid zoning laws); BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 162 (homeowners
are part of “incumbents’ club” which benefits from restrictions on housing supply).
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of claims about the evil effects of sprawl. Bruegemann’s rebuttal of some anti-sprawl
claims is fairly persuasive, given the difficulty of establishing cause and effect
relationships between sprawl and other social problems. For example, Bruegmann
correctly suggests that there is no way of knowing whether limiting sprawl will reduce
energy consumption enough to reduce global warming.114 Similarly, it is not clear
whether sprawl costs suburban taxpayers significantly more than compact
development,115 or whether sprawl will ever reduce food supply by creating a shortage of
farmland.116
But Bruegmann’s handling of other issues is far less supple. For example, he
attempts to deny the link between air pollution117 and sprawl by writing that the “cause of
the pollution was neither sprawl nor the automobile itself, but, rather, the inefficient fuel
source it used.”118 But as long as automobiles are using those inefficient fuel sources

114

See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 149 (“Even if everyone in the world came to live in the same way
as the inhabitants of European central cities, this would not, certainly by itself, solve the global warming
problem.”) Of course, if sprawl increases pollution, it probably contributes in some degree to global
warming. See infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text (describing relationship between sprawl and
pollution). However, there is no way of knowing how significant that contribution is.
115
Id. at 125. I note, however, that even if sprawl does not affect suburban or statewide tax burdens, sprawl
may increase the taxes of urban taxpayers under certain circumstances. See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 33637 (where new development is outside city limits, city taxes may increase because “if a city’s middle class
migrates en masse to suburbia, its tax base will be smaller and it, therefore, will, other things being equal,
have to raise taxes or reduce services” and because a poorer city electorate is more likely to favor
redistributive fiscal policies).
116
See BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 142 (sprawl does not endanger food supplies because so far,
“agricultural yields are going up and agricultural prices going down worldwide despite a reduction in the
amount of land devoted to agriculture”).
117
I discuss air pollution separately from global warming because even if global warming never becomes a
significant social problem, air pollution creates day-to-day health hazards such as lung damage. See
GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 121 (pollution causes damage to lung tissue as well as “reproductive and
neurological problems”).
118
BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 127. Bruegmann inexplicably adds: “For many of those in the antisuburban camp, however, developing new and cleaner fuel sources was the last thing they wanted. It
would only lead to more driving and to more sprawl.” Id. This unverifiable claim exemplifies the ad
hominem fallacy: Bruegmann is trying to “shift his argument from the point being discussed (ad rem) to
irrelevant personal characteristics of an opponent (ad hominem). Instead of addressing the issue presented
by an opponent, this argument makes the opponent the issue." Paul E. Salmanca, Constitutional
Protection for Conversations Between Therapists and Clients, 64 MO. L.REV. 77, 97 n. 106 (1999)

20

they are creating pollution. It logically follows that by increasing driving, sprawl
increases pollution. Perhaps some day automobiles will use more efficient fuel sources:
but until that day comes,119 more sprawl (other factors being equal) means more driving
means more pollution.
Bruegmann even tries to blame pollution on city-dwellers by asserting that “the
higher density of automobile use in the city meant that pollution was almost invariably
worse in dense areas.”120 Even if this statement is factually correct,121 the “higher density
of automobile use” in the city is caused in part by suburbanites driving in from
automobile-dependent suburbs and by urbanites driving to jobs in those suburbs.122 If
these drivers lived and worked in places where they could get to work without driving
(rather than in sprawling, automobile-dependent suburbs), dense areas might have fewer
cars on their streets, and thus less automobile-induced air pollution.123 Thus, sprawl
(other factors being equal) increases automobile-induced pollution even in central cities.
His treatment of the relationship between sprawl and obesity is similarly illogical.
(citation omitted). The sentence quoted seeks to persuade readers by attacking the alleged “anti-suburban
camp” rather than focusing on the relationship between sprawl and pollution.
119
And maybe even after that day comes, if auto travel increases faster than fuel efficiency. See
GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 114 (Environmental Protection Agency projects that even though cars are less
toxic than they were in 1970, “growth in VMT [vehicle miles traveled] will offset progress in reducing air
toxics by early this century, causing air pollution from highway vehicles to actually increase within the next
twenty years”).
120
Id. at 127.
121
In fact, it is by no means clear that compact places are more polluted. See Michael Lewyn, Sprawl,
Growth Boundaries and the Rehnquist Court, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 1, 47 (2002) (showing pollution figures
for various metropolitan areas, and concluding that “[m]etropolitan areas with high levels of public transit
use tend to have relatively clean air.”)
122
For example, in metropolitan Baltimore 10% of all workers commute from city to suburb, and 11%
commute from suburb to city. See BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, TSC NOTES, available
at http://www.baltometro.org/mambo/content/view/611/0/#household (visited June 12, 2006). Many of
these suburbs are extremely automobile-dependent. See JOB OPPORTUNITIES TASK FORCE,
BALTIMORE’S CHOICE: WORKERS AND JOBS FOR A THRIVING ECONOMY 22, available at
http://www.jotf.org/pdf/baltimoreschoice.pdf (visited July 4, 2006) (mass transit service minimal in
Baltimore’s growing outer suburbs).
123
Even in a city where all commuters drove to work, commuting to and from distant suburbs may increase
urban pollution, if a commuter driving to or from suburbia drives more miles within the city than she would
have driven if she lived in the city and drove to a job in the city.
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He writes that “ethnic and racial characteristics and low income are much more closely
associated with obesity than any particular land-use pattern.”124 This claim presents a
false dichotomy: either poverty causes obesity or sprawl causes obesity. But both may be
causes: poor people may be more likely to be obese than rich people, but poor people (or
for that matter, not-so-poor people) living in a neighborhood that discourages walking
may also be even more likely to be obese than other people with similar incomes.
Bruegmann’s attempt to break the link between sprawl and traffic congestion rests
on a slender factual base. At first glance, it might seem obvious that suburban life might
increase driving which in turn increases congestion. But Bruegmann defends sprawl on
the ground that “congestion and commuting times tend to rise, not fall, with density.”125
For example, Bruegmann cites Kansas City and Oklahoma City as role models of lowdensity places with little traffic congestion- and like most smaller cities, they do have less
congestion than bigger cities.126 But Bruegmann’s own examples rebut his claim. If
Bruegmann’s theory was correct, these low-density cities would experience reduced
traffic congestion if their densities fell over time. This was not the case in Kansas City,
where regionwide population density decreased by over 20% (from 1982 persons per
square mile to 1435) – yet the annual congestion-related delay per rush-hour traveler rose
from 2 hours per year to 17 hours per year.127 In Oklahoma City, population density did

124

BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 256 n. 14.
BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 141.
126
See TEXAS TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE, 2005 URBAN MOBILITY STUDY, NATIONAL
CONGESTION TABLES, TABLE 1, available at
http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/national/table_1.pdf (visited June 11, 2006) (listing
congestion for various regions, and noting that largest regions had most congestion, and smaller regions
had the least). The Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) is a state research agency affiliated with Texas
A&M University, which regularly conducts “urban mobility studies” addressing traffic congestion. See
Lewyn, supra note 121, at 43 (describing TTI); BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 255 n. 8 (citing TTI data)
127
TEXAS TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE, THE MOBILITY DATA FOR KANSAS CITY, MO-KS,
available at http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/kansas_city.pdf (visited June 11, 2006).
125
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not change significantly (increasing slightly from 1542 persons per square mile to 1568) and congestion nevertheless increased from 3 hours per year to 12 hours per year.128
Thus, sprawl has failed to reduce congestion, even in low-density, low-congestion
regions.
Bruegmann also claims that commuting times have not increased due to sprawl,
because jobs have followed population to the suburbs.129 But in fact, the percentage of
workers with 90-minute round-trip commutes has increased by 95% since 1990.130 And
as a matter of common sense, such long-distance commutes may be an inevitable result
of sprawl: if Employer X moves from downtown to northern suburb Y, its employees
who live in northern suburb Y may have shorter commutes, but its urban employees and
its employees in southern suburbs may have even longer commutes.131
More important than the anti-sprawl arguments Bruegmann mishandles are the
arguments he simply ignores. His chapter discussing the social costs of sprawl contains a
subheading for “Social Concerns and Equity Problems,”132 but his discussion under that

It could be argued, of course, that places such as Kansas City failed to build enough roads to accommodate
traffic. See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between road construction
and congestion). This argument is weak because if lower density reduces congestion, Kansas City’s
decreased density should have reduced traffic without any need for massive road construction.
128
TEXAS TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE, THE MOBILITY DATA FOR OKLAHOMA CITY, OK,
available at http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/oklahoma_city.pdf (visited June 11,
2006).
129
BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 141 (“the notion that sprawl causes congestion or longer commuting
trips is difficult to sustain in the face of data that show that commuting times in the United States did not
increase very much . . . The reason was that the decentralization of residences was accompanied by the
decentralization of jobs and other activities”). I note that despite the decentralization of employment,
suburbanites continue to have longer commutes than city residents. See SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
POLICY PROJECT, TRANSPORTATION DATA FROM THE 2000 CENSUS, available at
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/pop_trends.pdf (visited June 13, 2006) (average
suburbanite spends 26.9 minutes traveling to work as opposed to 24.9 for central city residents)
(“TRANSPORTATION DATA”).
130
Michelle Conlin et. al., EXTREME COMMUTING, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_08/b3921127.htm (visited June 12, 2006).
131
See STEVE BELMONT, CITIES IN FULL 149 (2002) (explaining point in more detail).
132
BRUEGMANN, supra note 1, at 143. Instead of focusing upon the effects of sprawl upon nondrivers
generally, he focuses on the question of whether cities should annex suburbs in order to improve urban tax
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subheading completely overlooks a major “equity problem” with sprawl- the plight of the
carless young, old, poor and disabled who lack access to jobs and shopping when streets
are unfit for pedestrians and transit service is inadequate.133 Almost one-third of all
Americans have no drivers’ license,134 including about 11.5% of Americans over 18.135
This figure almost certainly understates the number of nondrivers, since some Americans
acquired a drivers’ license at one time but do not own a car.136 Nondrivers tend to be
among the most physically and economically disadvantaged members of American
society: 21% of Americans over 65 do not drive,137 most children obviously do not
drive,138 almost half of disabled Americans have no car,139 and the majority of welfare
recipients do not own cars.140
Nondrivers, however, are not characters in Bruegmann’s story of suburban
triumph.141 In fact, Brugemann is an aggressive defender of government-funded road

bases, id. at 143-45- an important but not nationwide problem, since in many regions, cities have been able
to annex a significant portion of their suburbs. See GILLHAM, supra note 1, at 141 (of twenty largest U.S.
cities, seven were able to annex over 100 miles of suburban territory between 1950 and 1990).
133
See supra notes 9, 30-34 and accompanying text (noting difficulty of life for American nondrivers, and
pointing out that young, old and poor are especially likely to suffer from such problems).
134
See 2006 ABSTRACT, supra note 46, at 8 (there were 290.7 residents of the United States in 2003), 712
(196.1 million licensed drivers, or about 67% of resident population).
135
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2000 WNLR 9368643 (according to Karen Hughes, spokeswoman for then-Governor Bush, 25 million of
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construction,142 apparently ignoring the possibility that by moving jobs to suburbia,
expressways move jobs to areas far from public transit and thus inaccessible to people
without cars.143 Despite Bruegmann’s attempts to tie sprawl to freedom,144 he is all for
Big Government if it supports suburbia – even if Big Government’s decisions reduce the
mobility of nondrivers.
Instead of discussing the impact of sprawl upon the carless poor and disabled,
Bruegmann uses class war tactics to defend sprawl by characterizing the public debate
over sprawl as a conflict between the middle class (which allegedly benefits from the
opportunity to move to suburbia) and the upper class (which wants suburbia all to
itself).145 But Bruegmann’s tale of class war is incomplete, because it overlooks the
impact of sprawl upon the poor who cannot afford cars146 or suburban homes.147
Bruegmann also overlooks the fiscal impact of compulsory motoring upon the
vehicle-owning majority. The average American household spends $6,960 on vehicle
purchases, gasoline, vehicle maintenance and repair, and vehicle insurance.148 To the
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144
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extent that vehicle ownership is a virtually compulsory result of government policy,149
these expenditures are essentially a government-imposed tax, just like the income tax or
property taxes.150
Bruegmann writes that sprawl creates “mobility, privacy and choice.”151 But
where (as in large chunks of the United States) sprawl is so all-encompassing that
automobiles are necessities rather than luxuries, sprawl actually limits the mobility of
nondrivers and impairs consumer choice for drivers.
D. Myth Four: Sprawl Cannot Be Limited Without Suffocating Government
Interference
Bruegmann’s discussion of the effects of anti-sprawl measures, although
sometimes flawed, is more balanced than the rest of his book. He discusses numerous
policies designed to limit sprawl, and correctly points out that some attempts to limit
sprawl through land use regulation have been ineffective152 or have raised land prices by
constricting the supply of land.153
It is unclear, however, whether Bruegmann thinks these negative effects are
inevitable. In discussing Oregon’s planning system (which limits suburban development
around Portland and other Oregon cities by prohibiting large-scale development outside
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See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (automobile ownership almost compulsory in much of
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150
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Id. at 180-91. For example, some municipalities have sought to deter suburban development by
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Id. at 188-89 (using growth controls in Boulder, Colorado as example of regulation that “[b]y reducing
the supply of developable land . . . drove up the price of land and the cost of new housing.”)
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governmentally designated “urban growth boundaries”),154 Bruegmann goes back and
forth between condemning the Oregon system and acknowledging that the effects of
growth boundaries upon housing prices are unclear. At one point, Bruegmann writes that
the losers from the growth boundary include “all of the potential future inhabitants of the
city [who] will pay sharply higher prices for their houses than those who arrived before
the growth management measures started to have an effect.”155 But a few pages earlier,
he characterizes studies of the Oregon system’s effects upon prices as a “bewildering
duel of statistics”156 with “inconclusive”157 results.
Bruegmann’s relatively balanced treatment of growth controls, however, conceals
an error of omission: regardless of the effects of Oregon’s policies, it is certainly
possible in theory to limit development in outer suburbs without reducing the overall
amount of buildable land. Suppose, for example, that a state implements a system similar
to Oregon’s, but deregulates development inside the boundary. In such a situation, it is at
least possible that the amount of overall developable land in the region might stay the
same, thus avoiding massive increases in housing prices.158
Bruegmann also fails to adequately discuss the possibility of limiting sprawl
through more market-oriented, libertarian policies. The only such policy that Bruegmann
discusses in detail is the option of cutting government spending on sprawl-creating
expressways – an option Bruegmann vigorously rejects. He asserts that inadequate road
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construction “has led to a marked increase in congestion”159 while regions such as
Phoenix, Atlanta and Houston are “building [their way] out of congestion.”160 But in fact,
congestion increased in all three areas between 1982 and 2003: from 17 hours per rushhour traveler to 67 in Atlanta,161 from 39 hours to 63 in Houston,162 and from 18 hours to
49 in Phoenix.163 Bruegmann asserts that Chicago has not built enough freeways to
accommodate traffic-164 but two of the three regions he praises (Atlanta and Houston)
have more hours of delay per traveler than Chicago!165
In fact, the effects of road-building upon congestion are anything but certain.
Perversely, road-building may make some places more congested because of the
phenomenon of “induced traffic.”166 If a road makes suburb X more popular with
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commuters and employers,167 that suburb will attract more development, which means
roads going to and from suburb X will inevitably be more crowded.168
Moreover, Bruegmann’s focus on regulation and transportation overlooks the
possibility that sprawl can be limited by reducing rather than by increasing land use
regulation – in particular, by thinning out the web of zoning, parking and street design
regulations that make American suburbs so automobile-dependent. An libertarian antisprawl legal reform package would:
*Allow landowners to mix commercial and residential uses more frequently, so
that more Americans could live within walking distance of shops and jobs.169
*Allow the market, rather than zoning laws, to govern population density.170 If
landowners could build compact neighborhoods without government interference, more
people could live within walking distance of commercial areas or transit stops.171
*Abolish setback and minimum parking requirements that require owners of
apartment buildings, offices and stores to place buildings far from streets and to surround
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those buildings with parking lots.172 If landowners had the right to substitute houses and
shops for parking lots and to bring buildings closer to streets, they could create more
compact, pedestrian-friendly places by placing more buildings on a parcel, and could
make pedestrian commutes shorter and more pleasant by eliminating the seas of parking
that separate shops, offices and other destinations from each other.173
*Amend municipal subdivision regulations that require the construction of wide
streets.174 Wide streets take more time for pedestrians to cross, and thus discourage
walking both by lengthening a pedestrian’s commute and by increasing the amount of
time the pedestrian is exposed to traffic.175
*Allowing more on-street parking.176 On-street parking creates a buffer between
pedestrians and fast-moving cars, thus making walking more appealing.177
Unlike growth controls, some of these reforms might actually expand housing
supply; land that is today used for parking or streets could be used for additional housing.
And unlike regulation-oriented policies, these reforms would actually expand consumer
choice by reducing government regulation of land use. Thus, it is possible to increase the
172
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number of compact, pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods without making government more
intrusive or increasing housing prices. It follows that because Bruegmann gives short
shift to such deregulatory anti-sprawl reforms,178 his analysis of remedies for sprawl is
incomplete.
E.

Myth Five: Only Elitists Oppose Sprawl

Bruegmann repeatedly asserts that sprawl is what ordinary middle-class people
want, while “elites” dare to question this trend. For example, he claims that in the 1920s,
the creation of suburbs in Britain “led to a violent reaction among members of Britain’s
literary and artistic elite.”179 He asserts that in recent decades, “upper-middle-class
residents of central cities”180 engaged in an “assault on urban freeways”181 only when
“the automobile ceased to be a luxury item for the affluent and came into the hands of a
large middle class.”182 Bruegmann similarly writes that today, “the anti-sprawl movement
has been heavily supported by individuals drawn from an upper-middle class professional
population . . . an elite group of academics, central-city business leaders, and employees
of not-for-profit organizations.”183 This “elite” believes that “[s]prawl is where other
people live, particularly people with less taste and good sense than themselves. Much
anti-sprawl activism is based on a desire to reform these other people’s lives.”184 And
Bruegmann suggests that New Urbanism (a movement of architects who seek to design
178
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more mixed-use neighborhoods) is “only the latest version of a long-standing desire by
cultural elites to manage middle-class urban life.”185
All of these remarks are basically “ad hominem” attacks – that is, they target
people making anti-sprawl arguments, rather than the arguments themselves.186 This sort
of argument is logically fallacious, because even “elites” are sometimes right.
Moreover, it is simply not the case that only “elites” are concerned about sprawl.
This theory is implicitly rebutted by Bruegmann’s own statement that “[w]hen asked,
most Americans familiar with the term declare themselves against sprawl just as they say
they are against pollution or the destruction of historic buildings.”187 If “most Americans”
are in some sense against sprawl, opponents of sprawl are hardly an “elite.”
Bruegmann also writes that “stopping or slowing the growth of new development
and sprawl often provides great material advantage to existing residents”188 by reducing
the number of new cars on the roads that suburbanites use, and increasing home values by
limiting the supply of developable land.189 Since most Americans drive cars190 (and thus
may want less traffic near their homes) and own homes191 (and thus may want housing
prices to increase), it logically follows that most Americans have excellent selfish reasons
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to oppose new suburban development. And Americans who do not own cars have even
stronger motives to oppose sprawl: where jobs move to automobile-dependent suburbs,
carless Americans are frozen out of those jobs.192 So if both Americans with cars and
Americans without cars have reason to be concerned about sprawl, nearly all Americans
are part of Bruegmann’s so-called “anti-sprawl elite.”
Indeed, Bruegmann’s populist rhetoric could just as easily be turned against
sprawl, because the United States has a powerful pro-sprawl “elite”: the road-building
lobby.193 A wide variety of corporate interests, including automobile manufacturers, tire
manufacturers, cement manufacturers, car dealers, truckers,194 general contractors, and
homebuilders,195 lobby Congress to spend more money on highways,196 even though
federal spending on highways already exceeds transit spending by about a 5-1 margin.197
This elite gives vast amounts of money to politicians. For example, general contractors
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gave over $10 million to 81 Senators and 401 Congresspeople in 2004,198 car dealers
gave $4.6 million,199 and automobile manufacturers gave $1.5 million.200 But Bruegmann
does not describe automobile manufacturers or general contractors as “elites”, even
though these corporations may well have more money and power than the academics,
downtown businesses, and not-for-profit employees who Bruegmann describes as
“elites.” 201
If Bruegmann is trying to argue that only elites oppose sprawl, he is wrong
because most Americans favor some limits on suburban sprawl. If Bruegmann is trying
to argue that all elites oppose sprawl, he is equally wrong because the United States has
pro-sprawl elites aplenty. Either way, Bruegmann’s populist posing adds more heat than
light to debate over suburban development.
III.

Conclusion
Bruegmann’s book is less important in itself than as an example of some

common misconceptions about sprawl: the notion that the status quo is inevitable, the
denial of government complicity, and the denial of sprawl’s more unpleasant
consequences.
Bruegmann claims that sprawl exists in every affluent society- but there is a world
of difference between a region like New York City where an automobile-centered life is
one lifestyle choice among many, and a city like Oklahoma City in which almost every
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adult needs a car to live a normal life. Bruegmann claims that sprawl is a result of the
free market at work- but in fact, government-built highways fragment development
across the landscape, and government-enforced zoning, parking and street design
regulations impede the creation of alternatives to sprawl. Bruegmann claims that sprawl
expands consumer choice- but in its most extreme forms, sprawl actually limits consumer
choices by making the automobile the only feasible mode of transportation in many
places.
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